Why Hybrid Warfare is Eating the World
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In recent decades, the nature of conflict has shifted away from conventional warfare, where armies clash on defined battlefields, to hybrid warfare—an intricate strategy combining cyber operations, disinformation, economic coercion, and the use of proxy forces. This evolution in warfare parallels the broader transformation of society that Marc Andreessen describes in his seminal essay “Why Software Is Eating the World.” Just as software has permeated nearly every facet of modern life, blurring the boundaries between technology and industry, hybrid warfare blurs the lines between war and peace, reconfiguring how states and actors wield power and influence on the global stage.
Hybrid warfare goes beyond conventional warfare’s traditional tools. It involves a calculated mix of military action, cyber operations, economic pressure, and information manipulation, targeting both military and civilian spheres. This shift is especially impactful in a digitalized world where technology’s integration into every aspect of life provides new opportunities for influence and disruption. As Andreessen observed, software is transforming businesses by automating, enhancing, and enabling new capabilities, and hybrid warfare utilizes digital technologies to manipulate societies, undermine governments, and erode trust in democratic institutions.
In a sense, hybrid warfare is “eating” the world of traditional combat just as software has reshaped traditional industries. Andreessen points out that technology-driven companies are overtaking legacy businesses by leveraging software to scale rapidly, lower costs, and create novel solutions. Similarly, hybrid warfare uses a digital-first approach that capitalizes on the interconnectedness of global economies, communication networks, and political systems, achieving goals that would have required far more substantial military resources in the past. Hybrid warfare is, in effect, the software of modern conflict—scalable, versatile, and challenging to defend against.
Cyber warfare and disinformation are foundational elements of hybrid warfare, leveraging the same internet infrastructure that enables software to “eat” traditional industries. Just as software companies disrupt industries by reducing friction and breaking down barriers to entry, hybrid warfare uses the internet to bypass traditional defense mechanisms and inject instability directly into target societies. Cyber operations allow hostile actors to disrupt critical infrastructure, manipulate data, and exploit private information. Russia’s cyber operations against Ukraine and Estonia, and disinformation campaigns targeting Western democracies, are potent examples of how hybrid tactics can paralyze nations without a single shot being fired.
Andreessen argued that software enables companies to impact customers globally at minimal cost, pointing to Netflix’s rise over traditional media as it streamed content directly to users. Hybrid warfare adopts a similar tactic with disinformation campaigns—using social media to bypass traditional media, manipulate narratives, and amplify divisive content. This “software of conflict” offers the ability to destabilize societies with targeted influence, where political or social polarization is magnified, and trust in institutions is systematically eroded. Like Andreessen’s software revolution, this approach scales easily, is difficult to counteract, and requires only modest investment for potentially high-impact outcomes.
Economic coercion is another central component of hybrid warfare, mirroring how software companies gain power by controlling critical market segments. Just as technology giants like Google and Amazon wield significant economic influence, hybrid warfare tactics exploit economic dependencies to assert control or pressure states. Russia’s control over European energy supplies exemplifies this tactic; by leveraging Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, Russia gains political leverage without deploying military assets.
Andreessen pointed out that software companies disrupt traditional industries by shifting value and power to those who control digital infrastructure. In hybrid warfare, economic coercion similarly shifts power toward actors who control critical resources or supply chains. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which funds infrastructure projects worldwide, often leads to countries falling into debt, providing China with leverage to influence foreign policy in these regions. Economic power—akin to the monopolistic influence of tech giants—enables states to assert dominance without direct confrontation, reshaping geopolitical dynamics through the sheer force of market influence.
Hybrid warfare’s use of proxy forces and political subversion resembles the way software disrupts traditional power structures, bypassing traditional regulatory constraints and operating in spaces often out of reach for governments. By using local militias, insurgent groups, and other non-state actors, hybrid warfare proxies provide deniability, making it hard to attribute responsibility. This parallels how software companies like Uber and Airbnb have challenged local regulatory frameworks, reshaping entire industries by acting through decentralized networks of users and providers.
In hybrid warfare, this proxy approach is exemplified by Russia’s support for separatist groups in eastern Ukraine beginning in the mid-2010s. Rather than engaging in open conflict, Russia’s support for these proxies created instability while shielding the Kremlin from direct accountability. Just as software companies disrupt established industry norms, proxy forces undermine the rule of law, destabilizing governance and challenging conventional state sovereignty. Andreessen emphasized software’s ability to disrupt and bypass; in hybrid warfare, proxies operate similarly, enabling actors to pursue agendas that would be infeasible or politically costly under conventional warfare frameworks.
In the hybrid warfare landscape, defense strategies and security frameworks are struggling to keep pace, much as traditional industries have been disrupted by software’s rapid spread. As Andreessen noted, incumbents often fail to innovate at the pace of new technology, leaving them vulnerable to disruption. Traditional military defenses—tanks, missiles, and armies—are often ineffective against cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic manipulation. Just as legacy companies struggle to adapt to the agile, iterative pace of software development, conventional defense strategies must pivot to address the diffuse, multi-dimensional threats posed by hybrid warfare.
Addressing hybrid warfare requires the agility and innovation that Andreessen saw in software. Nations must invest in cyber defenses, develop capabilities for countering disinformation, and build resilient economies less dependent on adversaries. Intelligence sharing, public education, and inter-agency collaboration become essential as hybrid threats cross domains and borders, requiring a collaborative response. Hybrid warfare’s strength lies in its integration, combining elements that attack a nation’s vulnerabilities holistically, much as software integrates functionalities that redefine how people interact with technology, businesses, and each other.
Hybrid warfare represents the strategic evolution of conflict in a world increasingly dominated by software-driven systems, reflecting a shift in how power and influence are projected. Just as software has transformed traditional business models, hybrid warfare has transformed conflict, operating on multiple levels and circumventing traditional defenses. Hybrid tactics are, in many ways, the “software” of modern conflict, modular and adaptive, exploiting the interconnectivity and vulnerabilities of the digital age.
The implications are profound. As Andreessen’s “software revolution” reshapes every industry, hybrid warfare reshapes the geopolitical landscape, requiring new models of defense and resilience. States and societies must adapt, understanding that the new front lines are as much about networks, information, and influence as they are about soldiers, tanks, and missiles. Just as Andreessen’s vision of software reshaping the world has materialized, the parallel shift to hybrid warfare has created a landscape where security, stability, and governance must be continually redefined to meet the challenges of a world where the boundaries between peace and conflict, civilian and military, are increasingly blurred.