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Russian Strategic Ambitions Beyond Ukraine: The Implications for NATO and North American Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

Russian victory in Ukraine could set off a chain of events that leads to the weakening of North America’s strategic nuclear deterrence.
A chain of dominoes
Ukraine isn't a geopolitical island, it's the first domino in a game of the highest stakes.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscores a broader ambition to reshape the European security landscape and challenge the post-World War II rules-based order. If successful in Ukraine, Russia may pursue further territorial expansions or hybrid destabilizing actions across Europe, with targets likely including the Baltic states, the Baltic Sea, the Suwałki Gap, Moldova, the High North, and strategic locations in the Arctic. At the heart of Russia’s strategy is the Kola Peninsula, where its Northern Fleet—central to its nuclear deterrent—is stationed. This region is pivotal to Russia’s military objectives, providing year-round access to the Arctic for naval and nuclear assets, positioning Moscow to monitor and potentially restrict NATO’s presence in the area. NATO inaction or perceived weakness in any of these regions could embolden Russian aggression, with destabilizing effects beyond Europe. Most importantly, the perception of a Russian victory in Ukraine could set off a chain of events that leads to the weakening of North America’s strategic nuclear deterrence.

The High North and Nuclear Deterrence

The High North, particularly the Arctic regions near Norway’s Finnmark and Russia’s Kola Peninsula, is central to both NATO and Russian nuclear deterrence strategies. It represents the shortest ballistic missile trajectory between the major nuclear powers, making it crucial for early warning and missile defense. Russia’s concentration of nuclear forces, including the headquarters of Russia’s Northern Fleet and the majority of their ballistic missile submarines, on the Kola Peninsula, coupled with NATO’s surveillance capabilities around Kirkenes, Norway, highlights the region as a critical buffer and strategic vantage point. The retreat of Arctic ice opens new navigable routes, intensifying potential militarization and enhancing the region’s role in nuclear deterrence and power projection.

NATO Expansion and Finland’s Strategic Role

Finland’s accession to NATO marks a transformative shift in European security, adding 1,340 kilometers of shared border with Russia to NATO’s northern flank. Finland’s highly capable, cold-weather-trained forces, combined with its challenging terrain, add a substantial layer to NATO’s northern defense. Furthermore, Finland’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula enhances NATO’s surveillance capabilities in the Arctic, a sensitive area for Moscow. Russia perceives NATO’s presence in Finland as an erosion of its traditional buffer zone, driving Moscow to further consolidate its Arctic military assets, underscoring the Kola Peninsula’s centrality to Russian strategic priorities.

The Baltic States, Suwałki Gap, and Russian Influence Operations

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are especially vulnerable due to their proximity to Russia and significant Russian-speaking populations, whom Russia could exploit to justify intervention. The Suwałki Gap, a land corridor between Poland and Lithuania, separates Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave from Belarus. This corridor represents a strategic chokepoint; by controlling it, Russia could isolate the Baltics from NATO, enabling Moscow to project power throughout the region. Alongside its hybrid tactics, Russia actively conducts information operations in the eastern Baltic, targeting ethnic Russian populations and spreading narratives to undermine public confidence in NATO and Baltic governments, which, if unchecked, could destabilize the region.

In recent years, Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare tactics, employing Telegram channels to crowdsource sabotage in support of its interests. Through these channels, Russian operatives mobilize civilian sympathizers, instructing them on how to disrupt critical infrastructure and carry out low-level acts of sabotage. These decentralized disruptions strain the resources of NATO-aligned states, posing low-cost, high-impact threats that complicate security responses.

European Centers of Excellence: Finland and Estonia’s Strategic Roles

The locations of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki and NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn underscore Finland and Estonia’s pivotal roles in countering Russian aggression. Finland’s proximity to Russia and extensive experience with hybrid threats make it an ideal site for developing counter-hybrid strategies. Estonia’s resilience following the 2007 cyberattacks attributed to Russia has established it as a leader in cybersecurity, enhancing NATO’s capabilities through its cyber defense center. These centers are not only strategically positioned but also signify Europe’s commitment to safeguarding its borders from Russia’s unconventional threats.

Islands in the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Finland

Strategic islands in the Baltic Sea, such as Gotland and those in the Gulf of Finland, offer Russia potential control points over maritime routes and NATO movement. By occupying these islands, Russia could restrict NATO’s operational freedom in the region and apply pressure on Nordic countries. Such moves would enable Russia to deter NATO’s activities close to its borders while creating logistical challenges for NATO forces in the Baltic.

Moldova as a Southeastern Target

Moldova, with its unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region, remains susceptible to Russian influence. Transnistria hosts Russian troops, which Moscow could leverage to destabilize Moldova or deter it from Western alliances. Given its neutral status and lack of NATO membership, Moldova is a low-risk target for Russia. Control over Moldova would expand Russia’s influence in Southeastern Europe, amplifying pressure on Ukraine’s western flank and demonstrating the vulnerability of non-NATO states to Russian aggression.

Russian Objections to Aegis Ashore Systems in Poland and Romania

The Aegis Ashore missile defense systems in Poland and Romania are defensive installations intended to intercept ballistic missiles from non-European actors. However, Russia perceives these as threats to its own deterrence, viewing the Mk 41 launchers as adaptable for offensive use. In response, Russia has deployed Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, capable of targeting NATO infrastructure. This escalation reflects the cycle of mistrust between NATO and Russia, with Moscow perceiving encirclement and NATO viewing Russian actions as destabilizing. Additionally, the strategic value of Moldova is augmented by its proximity to the Aegis Ashore installation in Romania.

Erosion of the Rules-Based Order

Unchecked Russian aggression threatens to erode the post-World War II international order based on respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders. A failure to counter Russian moves decisively could embolden other revisionist powers globally, weakening international norms. For NATO, this would cast doubt on Article 5’s credibility and push vulnerable nations toward alternative security arrangements, fracturing the alliance and diminishing its deterrence. A weakened NATO could signal to other actors that power politics, rather than international law, governs global relations, destabilizing Europe and the broader global security framework.

Conclusion

Russia’s strategic aims in Europe, from dominating the Arctic to influencing Eastern Europe, underscore a challenge to NATO and the international order. Whether through territorial expansion or hybrid tactics, Moscow seeks to secure critical assets, undermine NATO cohesion, and reshape Europe’s security landscape. A resolute NATO response is essential to counter Russia’s ambitions, as inaction risks destabilizing Europe, encouraging other revisionist states, and unraveling a rules-based system that has maintained peace for over seven decades.

The loss or compromise of strategic territory in Eastern Europe and the High North directly threatens North America’s nuclear deterrence by weakening early warning capabilities, diminishing forward defense postures, and potentially exposing vulnerabilities in missile defense systems. Eastern European countries and the Arctic regions offer essential positioning for radar installations, missile defense systems, and bases that track and counter potential threats from adversarial nuclear forces, particularly Russia, and potentially a nuclear-capable Iran, in the future. 

If NATO loses control over these territories, it would face challenges in detecting and intercepting nuclear-capable submarines, aircraft, or missiles launched from the High North or Eastern European airspace, reducing response time and limiting North America’s defensive standoff. Additionally, compromised access to these regions could embolden adversaries to further militarize and strategically position their assets close to NATO borders, undermining deterrence stability and increasing the risk of escalation in a crisis. Maintaining secure and cooperative control over these territories is thus vital for protecting North America’s strategic nuclear defense posture and preserving global nuclear stability. Ukraine now stands as the first domino in this chain. The fate of Ukraine profoundly impacts the fate of us all.